

Patriot Priming in Presidential Elections:  
When and Why American Patriotism Matters in Voting for President

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**Abstract**

American patriotism has been a major theme in recent presidential campaigns. Perhaps because of the visible patriotic appeals during the 1988, 2004 and 2008 campaigns, studies show that patriotism was an important determinant of vote choice in each of those elections. Yet, prior research offers little basis for a broader understanding of when and why patriotic attitudes matter in presidential voting. This study provides that foundation by examining patriotism's influence on vote preference at multiple time periods during the 1988, 2004 and 2008 campaigns. I also compare those results with patriotism's impact on the 1992 and 2000 presidential elections, and analyze patriotic voting in congressional elections from 1988 to 2006. Taken together, the findings suggest that the 1988 presidential campaign was largely responsible for activating patriotism's significant impact on that year's election, but patriotic attitudes have become a sizable and stable predictor of Republican vote choice in post-9/11 national elections.

*Sometimes, as Senator Barack Obama seemed to argue earlier this year, a flag pin is just a flag pin. But it can never be that simple for anyone with direct experience of the 1988 presidential campaign. That year, the Republicans used the symbols of nationhood to bludgeon the Democrats, challenge their patriotism and utterly redefine their nominee, Gov. Michael S. Dukakis of Massachusetts. The memory of that campaign — reinforced, for many, by the attacks on Senator John Kerry's Vietnam War record in the 2004 election — haunts Democrats of a certain generation.*

- Robin Toner, *New York Times*, 4 May 2008.

American patriotism has taken center stage in recent presidential campaigns. Patriotic appeals, in fact, were at the heart of the Republicans' 1988 efforts to portray the Democratic nominee, Michael Dukakis, as an out of touch liberal who did not share the values of ordinary Americans (Abramson et al. 1991; Blumenthal 1990; Leege et al. 2002). From August of that year up through Election Day George H.W. Bush's campaign regularly criticized their opponent's 1977 veto of a Massachusetts bill requiring public school teachers to lead their students in reciting the pledge of allegiance. Vice President Bush also seized upon every opportunity to contrast his strong patriotism with Dukakis's unpopular pledge of allegiance veto.<sup>1</sup> He even made campaign stops at American Flag factories and further wrapped himself in the stars and stripes by regularly leading his audiences in the pledge. "The Bush campaign," according to John Zaller's (2005, 31) account of one of these factory visits, "calculated that journalists would be unable to resist the visual appeal of the patriotic setting, even if what the Vice President said was somewhat vacuous."

As the epigraph that introduced the article indicated, patriotism was also a salient theme in the 2004 and 2008 campaigns. Many suspected that the Swift Boat Veterans for Truth's negative campaign against both John Kerry's war record and his various anti-war activities after returning home from Vietnam had special resonance with patriotic Americans in the first presidential election after 9/11 and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq (Pace 2008; Reid 2004; Freeman 2004).<sup>2</sup> Barack Obama faced similar questions about his patriotism throughout 2008.<sup>3</sup>

Obama's patriotism-related controversies included his initial reluctance to wear an American flag pin, his wife's February 2008 comment that "for the first time in my adult lifetime, I'm really proud of my country," and the repeated showing of a sermon conducted before Obama's longtime church immediately after 9/11 in which Reverend Jeremiah Wright proclaimed: "The government gives [African-Americans] the drugs, builds bigger prisons, passes a three-strike law and then wants us to sing 'God Bless America'? No. No. No. Not 'God Bless America,' 'God damn America.'" The nagging suspicions about Obama's patriotism sparked by these episodes were probably most provocatively voiced in the following campaign speech from Sarah Palin: "We see America as the greatest force for good in this world. Our opponent though, is someone who sees America, it seems, as being so imperfect that he's palling around with terrorists who would target their own country."<sup>4</sup>

Perhaps because of such visible patriotic campaign appeals in 1988, 2004, and 2008, patriotism was found to be an important determinant of Americans' presidential vote choices in each of the those elections (Sullivan, Fried and Dietz 1992; Mockabee 2007; Parker, Sawyer and Towler 2009; see results below too). Yet, the fact that patriotism mattered in 1988, 2004 and 2008 does not necessarily imply that campaign content was responsible for this significant influence on presidential vote choice. It could simply be that American patriotism was a well-established and readily accessible consideration in party-line voting long before these three recent presidential campaigns ever focused on the candidates' patriotic attachments. Indeed, Leege et al. (2002) document the consistent salience of patriotism in Republican campaign appeals dating all the way back to Richard Nixon's 1968 presidential victory. The focus of prior patriotism research on one specific election year at a time, therefore, offers little basis for a broader explanation of when and why national pride matters in presidential voting.<sup>5</sup>

This study, on the other hand, provides a theoretical foundation for understanding patriotism's effects on vote choice by examining the influence of patriotic attitudes on voters' preferences at multiple time periods during the 1988, 2004 and 2008 campaigns. It also compares the results from those campaigns to patriotism's impact on the 1992 and 2000 presidential elections,<sup>6</sup> and analyzes patriotic voting for the two parties in congressional elections from 1988 to 2006. Taken together, the findings demonstrate that George H.W. Bush's 1988 campaign was largely responsible for the significant effects of patriotism in that year's election, but that patriotic attitudes have become a significant and stable determinant of partisan decision making in post-9/11 American politics.

### **When and Why Patriotism Matters: Patriot Priming or Chronic Accessibility?**

As just alluded to, there are conflicting explanations for patriotism's noted impact on citizens' vote choices in the 1988, 2004 and 2008 presidential elections—each of which has important implications for American electoral politics. The first explanation is rooted in the social psychological mechanism of priming. The priming hypothesis posits that the more attention campaigns and the media pay to a particular aspect of political life (i.e. patriotism) the more citizens will rely on that consideration in their political evaluations (see Kinder 2003 for a review). Several experimental and quasi experimental studies, for instance, show that campaigns can prime considerations like racial attitudes, economic evaluations and policy preference, thereby making them more important ingredients of the public's candidate evaluations and their vote choices (Valentino et al. 2002; Mendelberg 2001; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Hetherington 1996; Johnston et al. 2004; Hillygus and Shields 2008; although see Lenz 2009).

By the priming account, patriotism mattered in the 1988, 2004 and 2008 presidential elections because the issue was raised in Republican rhetoric. That is, patriotism was primed by

their campaigns. This hypothesis, which I describe as *patriot priming*, provides us with a number of testable expectations. First, the patriot priming hypothesis suggests that patriotism should have been a larger determinant of support for Bush against Dukakis *after* the pledge of allegiance became an important campaign issue in the summer and fall of 1988. Similarly, the Swift Boat campaign against John Kerry's anti-Vietnam War activities should have primed patriotic opposition to his candidacy in the late summer and fall of 2004, thereby enhancing the influence of patriotism on Americans' vote preferences. The priming hypothesis would also expect patriotic attitudes to be more important in voting for George H.W. Bush and George W. Bush in 1988 and 2004 than they were following the 1992 and 2000 campaigns in which their opponents' national attachments were not called into question to the same degree.<sup>7</sup> Finally, the abovementioned controversies surrounding Barack Obama's candidacy should have made patriotism a more powerful predictor of support for John McCain against Obama than it was in trial heats matching McCain against Hillary Clinton—a candidate who many more Americans perceived as patriotic than her Democratic rival, Barack Obama.<sup>8</sup>

An alternative explanation situates longstanding cultural differences between Democrats and Republicans, rather than patriot priming during a specific year's campaign, as the main reasons for patriotism's significant impact on recent presidential elections. Lege et al. (2002) argue that patriotism, race, gender and religion formed the core of Republicans' successful appeals to culturally conservative voters in the post-civil rights era. As a result, we might think of patriotism, racial conservatism, gender traditionalism and religiosity as Republican-owned traits. Petrocick's (1996) issue ownership theory, for example, argues that parties develop longstanding reputations for handling certain issues better (i.e. the GOP on national defense), and Hayes (2005) extends the theory to include traits that are typically stressed more often by one

party than the other in presidential campaigns (i.e. compassion by the Democrats; or in our case, patriotism by Republicans).

As a result of the reputations that formed from the Republicans' culturally conservative campaign appeals to race, gender and religion in the 1960s and 1970s (Leege et al. 2002), attitudes that were once unrelated to partisan decision making like racial conservatism, gender traditionalism and opinions about abortion became significant causes of partisanship and presidential voting in the contemporary era (Carmines and Stimson 1989; Valentino and Sears 2005; Stimson 2004; Adams 1997). By 1990, in fact, these issue evolutions had largely run their course, with abortion, racial conservatism and gender traditionalism now fully integrated and rather stable facets of partisan decision making regardless of how salient they were in the popular political discourse at a particular moment in time (Stimson 2004).

These stable effects of racial, gender and abortion attitudes suggest that issues pertaining to race, gender and religion are now most like chronically accessible considerations in mass partisan preferences. Unlike other attitudes that must be explicitly primed to have an effect on subsequent decision making (Higgins and King 1981), chronically accessible attitudes are spontaneously activated even without prompting from situational cues like campaigns (Sears 1993). For example, attitudes about desegregation exerted a substantial influence on 1972 vote choice despite hardly being mentioned by either candidate because the parties' distinct position on racial issues since 1964 were easy for voters to identify (Carmines and Stimson 1980). Similarly, the accessibility hypothesis posits that the venerable association of patriotism with the GOP established by Republican campaign rhetoric from the 1960s through the early 1980s should have predestined patriotic attitudes to significantly influence Americans' vote choices in

the 1988, 2004, and 2008 presidential elections regardless of whether the candidates' national attachments ever became noticeable campaign issues.

To be sure, the fact that some issues and traits are owned by parties and accessible in vote choices even without priming does not mean that campaigns and/or candidates cannot enhance their existing impacts. Petrocick (1996), in fact, argues that the purpose of a presidential candidate's campaign is to prime the issues that his party has a longstanding reputation of competently addressing. Nevertheless, the main expectation proffered by the accessibility hypothesis is that patriotic campaign appeals were not needed to make patriotism matter in recent presidential elections because these attitudes had already become readily accessible in partisan decision making by 1988. Based on this accessibility account, patriotism should have been a significant predictor of presidential vote choice from 1988 to 2008 regardless of what month or year this relationship was assessed. Likewise, the accessibility hypothesis's party specific emphasis suggests that patriotism will be an important determinant of Republican vote preference regardless of the Democratic candidate. That is, patriotism should consistently matter in party-line voting for congress and in different Republican-Democrat presidential matchups (i.e. McCain vs. Obama and McCain vs. Clinton).

As we shall see, though, the Republicans' cultural appeals to patriotism beginning in the 1960s and continuing up through the 1980s did not make patriotic attitudes a chronically accessible consideration in late twentieth century mass partisan decision making. On the contrary, patriot priming was required to activate its influence on the presidential vote in 1988. Patriotism, however, became a significant and stable predictor of Republican vote choice in national elections following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. I conclude by discussing the implications of these findings on American electoral politics.

## **Method**

### *Measuring Patriotism*

The primary measure of patriotism employed in this study is an additive scale consisting of two items in American National Election Study (ANES) surveys from 1988, 1992, 2002, and 2004. These two questions ask respondents (1) how strongly they love their country and (2) how good seeing the American flag makes them feel.<sup>9</sup> Survey items such as the two from the ANES's scale are often described as patriotism or symbolic patriotism (Conover and Feldman 1987; Sullivan et al. 1992), with Kosterman and Feshbach (1989, 271) concluding that those questions tap "the affective component of one's feeling toward one's country." Factor analyses further indicate that the patriotism scale utilized in this study is correlated but distinct from the blind attachments described by Adorno and his colleagues (1950, 107) as "uncritical conformity to the prevailing group ways, and rejection of other nations as outgroups" (Kosterman and Feshbach 1989; Huddy and Khatib 2007; Parker 2009).

The two-item ANES scale is augmented throughout the study with other questions designed to assess the public's patriotism. These items asked (1) how patriotic respondents were, (2) how proud they were to be American, and (3) how important it is for them to be American. Not surprisingly, the various measures of patriotism are all highly correlated. The "pride in being American" item was correlated with the ANES patriotism scale at .66 in 1988, and "importance in being American" correlated with patriotism at .65 in the 2004 ANES. These questions all seem to be tapping into the underlying patriotism dimension that Kosterman and Feshbach (1989, 271) argue "assesses the degree of love and pride in one's nation."

According to any of these measures, America is a very patriotic country. Every 0 to 1 patriotism measure (0 = least patriotic; 1 = most patriotic) utilized in this study yielded a mean of



at least .61, with all but this one measure above .76. That patriotic distribution of attitudes should have important political consequences. For, as Bartels (2006, 90) points out, the electoral implications of priming effects “depend crucially on the partisan balance of the attitudes and perceptions being primed.” With so many Americans expressing strong feelings of love and pride for their country, any patriot priming in the 1988, 2004, and 2008 was therefore likely to be a boon to the Republicans.

### *Control Variables*

Along with these measures of patriotism, the base model of vote choice employed throughout this study includes standard demographic, ideological and partisanship control variables. Controlling for party identification and ideology is especially important because these predispositions are significantly correlated with the ANES’s patriotism scale (Conover and Feldman 1987; Hurwitz and Peffley 1999; Parker 2009). As a result of those relationships, it is crucial to distinguish how campaign content may have primed patriotism from the more familiar mechanisms of ideological and partisan activation that sometimes take place over the course of presidential campaigns (Gelman and King 1993; Hillygus and Jackman 2003; Bartels 2006; Tesler and Sears 2010). Similarly, it is imperative to distinguish patriot priming from other factors suspected to have also been activated by recent campaigns, such as racial resentment in 1988 (Kinder and Sanders 1996; Mendelberg 2001), authoritarianism in 2004 (Hetherington and Weiler 2009), and attitudes about African-Americans and Muslims in 2008 (Tesler and Sears 2010). Some model specifications, therefore, include measures of these variables to ensure that patriotism’s impact on the vote in 1988, 2004, and 2008 was not spuriously produced by omitting such relevant predispositions from the analysis.

## **Patriotic Voting for George H.W. Bush in 1988 and 1992**

Journalistic accounts of the 1988 presidential election maintained that George H.W. Bush's campaign strategy was the primary reason why his sizable polling deficit against Michael Dukakis in the spring and summer of that year turned into a safe lead heading into Election Day (Gelman and King 1993; Vavreck 2009). Of course, Bush's sustained focus on Dukakis's pledge of allegiance veto factored heavily into the media's lavish praise of his seemingly adept campaign (e.g. San Francisco Chronicle 1988, quoted in Gelman and King 1993, 421; New York Times 1988, quoted in Vavreck 2009, 1). Some analysts even marshaled a modicum of empirical evidence in support of their claims about the campaign's effectiveness, such as a *Times Mirror* Poll showing that 39 percent of Bush voters cited the pledge of allegiance controversy as a "very important" reason for their votes (Edsall 1988). Nevertheless, Gelman and King (1993) criticized the media's focus on Bush's campaign tactics as an unsystematic, outcome-driven explanation for his victory. Instead, they argue that Bush overtook Dukakis in the polls largely because his campaign informed voters about "fundamental" variables that favored his candidacy like the state of the economy.<sup>10</sup>

The patriot priming hypothesis, on the other hand, is more sympathetic to the journalistic explanations for the 1988 election result. It posits that the Bush campaign's emphasis on patriotism and the pledge of allegiance—symbolic issues that are by no means considered "fundamental" causes of presidential vote choice—could have played an important part in his rising poll numbers by activating patriotic opposition to Dukakis. If that claim were true, then Bush should have performed disproportionately better among the most patriotic Americans *after* the pledge of allegiance became a major campaign issue in August 1988.

The patriot priming hypothesis is testable with the May 1988 and January 1989 *People, Press & Politics Values Surveys* (PVS).<sup>11</sup> Like other national polls conducted during the late spring and early summer of 1988, Dukakis was safely leading Bush in the May PVS (52 percent to 40 percent in favor of Dukakis). The retrospective vote reports from the January 1989 survey, however, closely resembled Bush's actual 8-percentage point popular vote victory (51 percent to 45 percent in favor of Bush). Since both of these surveys asked how patriotic their respondents are, we can determine whether Bush's improved poll standing from May to Election Day was aided by patriot priming.

The first panel of figure 1 tests the patriot priming hypothesis by graphing out Bush support as a function of patriotism in both the May 1988 and January 1989 PVSs. The display shows that the extent to which respondents agreed with the statement, "I am very patriotic" had an insignificant independent impact on Bush-Dukakis vote intention in May 1988. Yet, as expected from the priming hypothesis, the effects of that self-reported patriotism item on support for Bush increased substantially over the course of the campaign. Even with partisan and demographic variables held constant, changing from least to most patriotic now increased Bush's vote share by more than 30 percentage points in the January 1989 PVS.

Figure 1A also shows that his rising poll numbers from May to Election Day were concentrated amongst the most patriotic Americans. Bush's model-predicted two-party vote share in May 1988 increased by 16 percentage points in the January 1989 PVS among respondents who strongly endorsed the statement, "I am very patriotic," with little change in his support among those who disagreed with that assertion. And in the raw data without any control variables accounted for, Bush improved upon his two party-vote share from May by 13 percentage points among the most patriotic group of respondents in the January PVS compared

to only a 5 percentage point improvement over the course of the campaign among the remainder of that sample.<sup>12</sup>

Contrary to the accessibility hypothesis's expectation of consistently large patriotism effects on party-line voting, then, it appears that patriotic campaign appeals were required to activate this predisposition's impact on support for Bush against Dukakis. Moreover, the disproportionate increase in support among the most patriotic, which is shown in the first panel of figure 1, indicates that Bush's patriot priming played an important part in his surging poll numbers over the course of the campaign.

As Lenz (2009) cautions, though, increased effects of a variable over time in cross-sectional survey data, such as those in figure 1A, do not necessarily support the priming mechanism. Rather than patriotism's impact on vote choice increasing because of patriot priming, it could simply be that Bush voters became more patriotic in order to rationalize their pre-existing support for his candidacy. Or perhaps Bush supporters actually grew more patriotic as a result of their preferred candidate winning the White House. Either of those processes could have produced the enhanced effects of patriotism on support for Bush from May to Election Day. The evidence, however, suggests that the larger patriotism effects in the January PVS were produced by patriot priming. If Americans were changing their overall levels of patriotism in response to the 1988 election, we should see Republicans becoming more patriotic during this time span. Yet, the partisan distributions of answers to the "I am very patriotic" item were nearly identical in the May 1988 and January 1989 surveys.<sup>13</sup> That aggregate stability of responses by party identification makes it unlikely that the public was changing their patriotic attitudes as a result of the campaign. We can be more confident, then, in concluding that priming was largely responsible for the significant impact of patriotism on presidential voting in 1988.

It is also reassuring that the 1988 patriot priming result replicates in the 1988 and 1992 ANES, especially since both of these surveys contained Kinder and Sanders's (1996) racial resentment battery. Previous research on Bush's 1988 campaign strategy focused on racial priming rather than patriot priming. Those studies contend that the introduction of the race-charged Willie Horton issue into the national debate succeeded in activating racially resentful opposition to Dukakis's candidacy (Kinder and Sanders 1996; Mendelberg 2001).<sup>14</sup> Or, as one Dukakis consultant put it at the time, "That's what the campaign is going to be about, patriotism and racism" (quoted in Blumenthal 1990, 308). Race and patriotism, however, were not nearly as visible campaign themes in 1992 (Kinder and Sanders 1996; Legee et al. 2002). The patriot priming hypothesis, therefore, suggests that patriotism should be a correspondingly less important determinant of Americans' presidential vote choices in 1992 than it was in 1988.

This expectation is tested in the second panel of figure 1. The display graphs out Bush support against both Michael Dukakis in 1988 and Bill Clinton in 1992 as a function of respondents' scores on the ANES's two-item patriotism scale. Even with racial resentment and the other base model variables held constant, patriotic attitudes had a significant impact on voting for Bush in 1988.<sup>15</sup> All else being equal, a change from least to most patriotic increased his two-party vote share in that election by 35 percentage points. As the patriot priming hypothesis suggests, patriotism was a much weaker consideration in the 1992 election. Figure 1B, in fact, shows that patriotic attitudes had roughly twice the impact on support for Bush in 1988 that they had in 1992.

As a final test of the patriot priming hypothesis, the last two columns of Table 1 compare the impact of patriotism on 1988 and 1992 presidential vote choice among 1992 ANES respondents who recalled voting for the two major party candidates in both of those elections.

That comparison is less susceptible to the abovementioned reverse causality concern because it tests patriotism, as measured in 1992, on reported vote choice in 1988 and 1992. Consistent with the earlier results on patriot priming, the final columns of Table 1 indicate that this 1992 measurement of patriotism had more than twice the impact on 1988 vote recall than it had on the same respondents' 1992 vote choices. All else being equal, a change from least to most patriotic was associated with more than a 20 point increase in 1988 Bush vote share compared to only a 10 increase in 1992.

It appears from these results, then, that patriotism was not an immediately accessible consideration in voting for George H.W. Bush in either 1988 or 1992. In fact, the first panel of figure 1 showed that patriotic attitudes did not significantly influence vote preference in 1988 until after a fall campaign that trafficked heavily in patriotic symbolism. Without such patriot priming in the 1992 campaign (Leege e al. 2002), patriotism once again became a non-significant predictor of support for George H.W. Bush. The deactivation of patriotism in between these two elections was brought about primarily by the most patriotic Americans who defected from their support for Bush in 1988 to vote for Clinton in 1992. In other words, the most patriotic Americans, who had been activated by Bush's patriot priming in 1988 (figure 1A), were deactivated when this issue was not as salient of a theme during the 1992 campaign (figure 1B).

### **Patriotic Voting for George W. Bush in 2000 and 2004**

If, as the results from 1988 and 1992 suggested, patriotic communications can activate patriotism in presidential vote choice, then these attitudes should have been a stronger determinant of support for George W. Bush against John Kerry in 2004 than they were in his 2000 contest versus Al Gore. After all, Entman (2004, 1-2) documents the "patriotic fervor" that swept through both the media and the Bush administration's rhetoric following the 9/11 terrorist

attacks. Many commentators also saw the 2004 campaign against John Kerry's anti-Vietnam War activities by the Swift Boat Veterans for Truth as a straightforward strategy to prime patriotic opposition to his candidacy (e.g. Reid 2004; Freeman 2004). These patriotic communications could have easily made patriotism more important in 2004 presidential voting than it had been in 2000.

Figure 2 tests whether the impact of patriotic attitudes on support for George W. Bush did, in fact, increase from 2000 to 2004. The first panel in the figure graphs out patriotism's effect on Bush vote choice against both Al Gore in 2000 and John Kerry in 2004 among ANES respondents who were interviewed in all three waves of the 2000-2002-2004 panel study. Unfortunately, this data is suboptimal in that patriotism was not assessed until the 2002 survey. Nevertheless, the results are quite suggestive. Perhaps because a 2002 measure of patriotism is used,<sup>16</sup> the first panel of figure 2 shows that patriotic attitudes had an unexpectedly sizable, though not quite statistically significant, impact on support for Bush in 2000. Despite that large baseline effect on vote choice in 2000, patriotism's impact noticeably increased among the same panel respondents in the 2004 election. Even with authoritarianism—a predisposition thought to have also been activated by the 9/11 attacks (Hetherington and Weiler 2009)—and the base model variables held constant, changing from least to most patriotic increased Bush's vote share against John Kerry by 55 percentage points. According to these results, at least, patriotism's impact on presidential vote choice was activated between 2000 and 2004.

Because this conclusion is informed by testing a 2002 measure of patriotism on panel respondents' vote choices in 2000 and 2004, it is important to replicate the results presented in the first panel of figure 2. Unfortunately, the replication data presented in the second panel of figure 2 is not ideal either. The post-election *Gallup Poll* from November 2000 asked

respondents how proud they were to be American,<sup>17</sup> whereas the 2004 ANES asked how important it is to be American. So, while both measurements should be tapping into the same patriotic attitudes, the results from the two surveys may not be entirely comparable.

Once again, though, the evidence indicates that patriotic attitudes were activated between 2000 and 2004. The Gallup results presented in figure 2, for instance, show that Americans' feelings of national pride had a negligible independent impact on their vote choices in the 2000 presidential election. A similar null patriotism effect was also found in a June 1999 Gallup trial heat between Bush and Gore (see table A1 of the supplemental appendix).<sup>18</sup> Patriotic attitudes, however, were once again found to significantly influence support for George W. Bush's reelection in 2004. All else being equal, a change from placing little importance on being an American to saying it is extremely important increased support for Bush against John Kerry by over 30 percentage points in the 2004 ANES.

Taken together, the results in Figure 2 are inconclusive as to whether patriotism mattered in Americans' preferences for George W. Bush over Al Gore in the 2000 election. Both panels in the display, however, strongly suggest that patriotic attitudes were *more important* four years later in Bush's matchup with John Kerry.

### **Patriotism's Accessibility in 2004 and 2008 Presidential Vote Preference**

The question then becomes, why was patriotism more important in 2004 voting than it was in 2000? Expectations put forth by the priming and accessibility hypotheses once again offer contrasting explanations for why patriotism was a more important determinant of presidential vote choice for George W. Bush in 2004 than it was in 2000. The accessibility account suggests that both the 9/11 attacks and the strong Republican response to them made patriotism a highly accessible consideration in partisan decision making. That is, patriotic



attitudes were predestined by 9/11 and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan to be an important factor in 2004 presidential voting regardless of how much attention was paid to the national attachments of George W. Bush's eventual opponent. The patriot priming hypothesis, on the other hand, posits that patriotism was more important in 2004 vote choice than it was in 2000 because the Bush campaign in general, and the Swift Boat Veterans for Truth in particular, cast aspersions on John Kerry's commitment to America. Much like the 1988 election, this priming account expects patriotism's impact to increase over the course of the campaign.

Figure 3A tests these competing hypotheses by graphing out the impact of patriotism on support for George W. Bush against various potential Democratic opponents; it also examines the effect of patriotic attitudes on Bush-Kerry vote choice at different times in 2004. The first panel in the figure shows the relationship between American pride and support for Bush's reelection among respondents in a January 2004 *Gallup Poll*.<sup>19</sup> That survey asked respondents who they would prefer to be elected in a contest between Bush and a generic Democrat. These same individuals were then asked to choose between Bush and Howard Dean—a candidate whose anti-war campaign left him susceptible to attacks against his patriotism. The display shows that pride in America had a strong influence on support for Bush's re-election, no matter who his hypothetical opponent was at the time. Even with the base model variables held constant, respondents with the strongest feelings of national pride were 45 percentage points more likely to support Bush than those who were not too proud to be American. These results suggest that patriotic attitudes were a readily accessible consideration in the 2004 election, as national pride was implicated in support for George W. Bush at the very beginning of the year regardless of his potential opponent.

The second panel of figure 3A then tests whether these strong patriotism effects in January 2004 continued throughout the election year. The *Kaiser Foundation* survey, which was conducted from late May to early August 2004,<sup>20</sup> provides an important baseline measure of patriotism's impact on support for George W. Bush against John Kerry. Indeed, the survey was completed just before the Swift Boat Veterans for Truth ads began airing on August 4, 2004. That fortuitous timing allows us to determine the impact of national pride on Bush-Kerry vote choice prior to the campaign's most intense period of patriot priming. The results in the display show that the Swift Boat ads were not needed to make patriotism a significant determinant in the 2004 election. American pride was an important ingredient of support for Bush against Kerry back in the early summer months before these ads had ever hit the airways. All else being equal, Americans with the lowest and highest feelings of pride in their country were separated by 35 percentage points in their support for Bush before the fall campaign began.

It also appears that the swift boat ads did not enhance the existing impact of patriotic attitudes. The second panel of figure 3A, for instance, shows that the effects of patriotism on vote intention in the Kaiser survey were indistinguishable from those yielded on vote choice in the post-election ANES. While differences in these surveys' question wordings and sampling designs cannot completely rule out the possibility that the campaign further activated patriotic attitudes, we can be confident that patriot priming was not necessary to make patriotism matter in the 2004 presidential election. Patriotism was a large determinant of support for Bush regardless of who his opponent was from the onset of the election year, and these significant effects persisted over the course of the campaign.

Figure 3b shows that patriotic attitudes were also a sizable and stable predictor of support for John McCain throughout 2008. The first panel of the display graphs out patriotism's impact

on support for McCain in trial heats against both Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton in the March 2008 wave of the Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project's panel study (CCAP, Jackman and Vavreck 2009). These different trial heat matchups against John McCain are particularly informative. Previous CCAP analyses, for example, show that racial resentment and Muslim favorability had over three times the effect on support for McCain against Obama than they had in the McCain-Clinton matchup (Tesler and Sears 2010; see also Table A3). Since Obama's above-referenced patriotism related controversies all occurred shortly before these March 2008 trial heats, the priming hypothesis suggests that patriotic attitudes would also be a significantly more important determinant of support for McCain against Obama than against Clinton. Yet after controlling for racial resentment, Muslim favorability and our base model variables, the first panel of figure 3B shows that patriotism had nearly identical effects on McCain vote intention against both Clinton and Obama.<sup>21</sup> As was the case in 2004, we can conclude that campaign communications questioning the Democratic candidate's commitment to America were not needed to make patriotism matter in 2008 vote choice. Patriotic attitudes were a sizable determinant of support for McCain in early 2008 against both Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton.

Also like 2004, these patriotism effects persisted rather stably throughout the election year. CCAP panel respondents, for instance, utilized patriotism to similar degree when formulating their preferences in both the March 2008 McCain-Obama trial and on Election Day (see table A3 of the supplemental appendix). Similarly, the second panel of figure 3B once again shows that patriotic attitudes, as measured by pride in America in a June 2008 *CNN Poll* and importance in being American in the CCAP, influenced presidential vote preferences regardless of when these surveys were fielded. With the base model variables held constant, a change from

least to most patriotic increased support for McCain by over 30 percentage points in both of these surveys.

In sum, patriotism's effects on presidential vote preferences in 2004 and 2008 were remarkably stable across five different potential general election matchups. Moreover, patriotic attitudes were a significant determinant of support for Bush in 2004 and McCain in 2008 regardless of when the survey was conducted and how patriotism was operationalized. That strong stability indicates that patriotism's influence on 2004 and 2008 vote choice was not campaign or candidate specific. We can confidently conclude, then, that patriot priming during presidential campaigns was no longer needed to activate patriotism's influence on Americans' vote choices on presidential elections. Rather, patriotic attitudes appear to be chronically accessible in post-9/11 partisan decision making.

### **Patriotism's Accessibility in Post-9/11 Congressional Vote Choices**

If patriotism did, in fact, become a chronically accessible consideration in party-line voting, then patriotic attitudes should influence Americans' vote preferences for the House of Representatives more heavily in post-9/11 elections than they did before the terrorist attacks. Figure 4A tests this expectation by graphing out Republican vote choice for the House of Representatives as a function of patriotism in the 1988, 1992, 2002, and 2004 ANES surveys. The first panel of the display shows that patriotic attitudes did not significantly influence Americans' congressional voting in either 1988 or 1992. Moving on to the second panel of the display, we see that the effects of patriotism on House vote choices in 2002 and 2004 were more than two times larger than they were in either 1988 or 1992. Moreover, the impact of patriotic attitudes on support for Republican congressional candidates was nearly identical in both 2002 and 2004. All else being equal, Americans who had the highest scores on the patriotism scale

were about 35 percentage points more supportive of Republican candidates than those with the lowest levels of patriotism.

As a final test of patriotism's accessibility in partisan decision making, Figure 4B graphs out the effects of patriotic attitudes on the congressional vote choices of 1992-1994 and 2004-2006 ANES panel respondents. The first panel of the display shows that patriotism, as measured in 1992, had a small and inconsistent impact on panelists' votes for congress in 1992 and 1994. The second panel of the figure, however, shows that patriotism, as measured in 2004, was a significant and stable determinant of support for Republican House candidates in both the 2004 and 2006 elections.

The strong stability of patriotism's impact on Americans' 2002, 2004, and 2006 congressional vote choices, especially when contrasted with the non-significant and inconsistent effects of these attitudes in 1988, 1992, and 1994, once again suggests that patriotism became a chronically accessible consideration in party-line after the 9/11 attacks. When combining these results from congressional elections with the persistent patriotism effects over the course of 2004 and 2008 presidential campaigns shown above, it appears that patriotic attitudes are now important and stable determinants of how Americans vote in national elections regardless of both the candidates and the offices they are seeking.

### **Conclusion**

The results presented indicate that the two potential explanations proffered for patriotism's significant impact on recent presidential elections—patriot priming and chronic accessibility—can be effectively partitioned into pre- and post-9/11 eras. Patriotic attitudes were not especially accessible in partisan decision making before the September 11 terrorist attacks. Instead, patriotism had to be explicitly primed by the 1988 presidential campaign to make it an

important determinant on vote choice. After 9/11, however, patriotic attitudes have become a chronically accessible consideration in party-line voting. Patriot priming during presidential campaigns, therefore, was no longer needed to make patriotism matter in national elections from 2002 to 2008.

Both the pre-9/11 patriot priming and post-9/11 accessibility findings could have important implications for American electoral politics. Bush's 1988 campaign strategy is still often cited as the reason for his victory in that election. Daron Shaw (2007), for example, notes that campaign scholars and campaign consultants generally agree that "George H.W. Bush, was able to erase Democratic nominee Michael Dukakis's double-digit lead in the polls by painting Dukakis as unpatriotic and weak on crime" (26). Ansolabahere (2006, 30) similarly acknowledges the widespread belief that the "Republicans' messages of crime, patriotism, and conservatism resonated well with the public." Up until now, however, there was little systematic evidence to support this longstanding contention that Bush's emphasis on patriotism during the 1988 campaign helped him win the White House.

The large patriot priming effects found in that campaign are not just informative for what they tell us about the 1988 election outcome, though. These results also suggest that presidential candidates can enhance their support during the campaign by stressing issues—even purely symbolic, non-fundamental ones like patriotism—that favor their candidacies (see Gelman and King 1993, Petrocick 1996, and Tesler and Sears 2010 for instances of enhanced presidential support generated by priming more fundamental considerations like presidential performance evaluations, ideology and partisanship). Indeed, Bush's activation of the majority of Americans who are strongly patriotic during the summer and fall of 1988 proved quite beneficial to his electoral prospects, as shown in figure 1.

Patriot priming, however, was not needed to activate patriotism's influence in post-9/11 national elections. Whether or not this chronic accessibility of patriotic attitudes in party-line voting documented in figure 3 and figure 4 continues into the future remains to be seen. It could be that with the 9/11 attacks fading deeper into history and with phased troop withdrawals from Afghanistan and Iraq scheduled, patriotism will once again need to be explicitly primed in order to matter in voting for president. Because party reputations tend to be rather stable phenomena, though (Petrocick 1996), it is more likely that the patriotic fervor provoked by the 9/11 attacks and the Bush administration's forceful response to them has made patriotism a durable Republican-owned trait. In that event, patriotic attitudes would likely be a lasting determinant of party-line voting, much the way that the party reputations created by the visible appeals to race, gender and religion during the 1970s and 1980s made racial conservatism, gender traditionalism and opinions about abortion stable facets of partisan decision making since 1990 (Leege et al. 2002; Stimson 2004). All else being equal, this potential polarization of party politics by patriotism should be electorally beneficial for the Republican Party. For, as noted above, America is a very patriotic country.

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Figure 1A




Figure 1B





Figure 1: Bush Vote Preference as a Function of Patriotic Attitudes. Probabilities are based on logistic regression coefficients in table 1. Predicted probabilities were calculated by setting all other variables to their sample means.

Table 1: Predictors of George H.W. Bush Vote Preference (Logistic Regression)

	PVS Data		ANES Time Series		1992 ANES	
	May '88	Jan '89	1988	1992	1988	1992
"I am Very Patriotic"	.362 (.306)	1.28 (.426)				
Patriotism			1.59 (.495)	.802 (.499)	1.15 (.505)	.500 (.590)
Partisanship	5.31 (.192)	6.57 (.319)	5.18 (.322)	5.37 (.327)	6.71 (.477)	5.49 (.369)
Education	-.198 (.169)	-.678 (.265)	.204 (.339)	.351 (.357)	-.820 (.387)	.438 (.400)
Age	-.003 (.003)	-.007 (.005)	-.003 (.006)	-.002 (.006)	-.003 (.006)	-.003 (.007)
Black	-.284 (.228)	-.886 (.336)	-1.53 (.484)	-1.47 (.478)	-.348 (.349)	-2.15 (.478)
Male	.407 (.113)	.135 (.167)	-.002 (.184)	-.291 (.193)	-.204 (.206)	-.191 (.219)
South	.698 (.126)	.853 (.195)	.742 (.212)	.356 (.207)	.689 (.223)	.357 (.240)
Ideology			2.37 (.514)	3.63 (.537)	.697 (.560)	3.44 (.621)
Racial Resentment			1.49 (.436)	1.76 (.476)	1.78 (.493)	1.87 (.551)
Observations	2535	1474	1131	1214	970	970

*Note:* Dependent variables are coded 1 for Bush vote preference and 0 for Dukakis (1988)/Clinton (1992). All variables are coded 0-1, with 1 representing either the most conservative position or the highest variable value see supplemental appendix for full range of variable values. Analyses in the final two columns are restricted to respondents who expressed a vote preference for one of the two major party candidates in both 1988 and 1992. *Source:* People, Politics and Press/Times Mirror Values Study, May 1988, January 1989; 1988 and 1992 ANES



*Figure 2: Bush Vote Choice as a Function of Patriotic Attitudes.* Probabilities are based on logistic regression coefficients in table A1 of the supplemental appendix. Predicted probabilities were calculated by setting all other variables to their sample means.

Figure 3A: 2004




Figure 3B: 2008




Figure 3: Support for Republican Presidential Candidates in 2004 and 2008 as a Function of Patriotic Attitudes. Probabilities are based on logistic regression coefficients in tables A2 and A3 of the supplemental appendix. Predicted probabilities were calculated by setting all other variables to their sample means.



Figure 4A: Cross-Sectional Data




Figure 4B: Panel Data




Figure 4: Republican Vote Choice for House of Representatives as a Function of Patriotic Attitudes. Probabilities are based on logistic regression coefficients in table A4 of the supplemental appendix. Predicted probabilities were calculated by setting all other variables to their sample means.

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<sup>1</sup> A CBS/New York Times poll conducted September 8-11, 1988 found that 70 percent of Americans said school teachers should be required to lead students in the pledge of allegiance.

<sup>2</sup> Kerry responded to these attacks on his patriotism in September 2004, stating: "For the past week they attacked my patriotism and my fitness to serve as Commander-in-Chief. Well, here's my answer: I'm not going to have my commitment to defend this country questioned by those who refused to serve when they could have and by those who have misled the nation into Iraq" (quoted in Reid 2004).

<sup>3</sup> Obama responded to these questions about his patriotism in June 2008, saying, "Throughout my life, I have always taken my deep and abiding love for this country as a given...And yet at times over the last 16 months, my patriotism has been challenged -- at times as a result of my own carelessness, more often as a result of the desire by some to score political points and raise fears about who I am and what I stand for" (quoted in Wesiman and Shear 2008).

<sup>4</sup> Palin made this statement at a campaign rally in Englewood, Colorado on October 4, 2008.

<sup>5</sup> Sullivan et al. (1992) is the one exception to these patriotic voting analyses that examined just one specific presidential election outcome—they asked their 1988 respondents how they voted back in 1984. However, the fact that their data is just from Minnesota—Walter Mondale's home state and the only state he won in his 1984 presidential contest against Ronald Reagan—complicates comparing the effects of patriotism on voting for president in 1984 and 1988.

<sup>6</sup> There were no surveys in 1996 that included both a measure of patriotic attitudes and presidential vote preference. Testing a 1992 measure of patriotism on American National Election Panel respondents' vote choices in 1996, however, produces a coefficient on patriotic attitudes that neither statistically nor substantively significant. That result is consistent with the null findings presented in the other Clinton-Gore elections in 1992 and 2000. The analysis begins with the 1988 election because this is the first year in which a direct measure of patriotism's influence on vote preference is available.

<sup>7</sup> Leege et al (2002, 127) argue that after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, "The patriotism issue that had anchored Republican campaign strategy from the early Nixon years onward was gone."

<sup>8</sup> Two Pew Polls in March and April 2008 asked respondents whether the trait patriotic applies to Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton. Of those surveyed, 76 percent said Clinton was patriotic in March 2008 compared to 64 percent for Obama. One month later Clinton lead Obama in this trait by a margin of 76 percent to 61 percent (accessed from ipoll).

<sup>9</sup> The alpha reliabilities for these two-item additive scales were .76 (1988 ANES), .77 (1992 ANES), .77 (2002 ANES) and .74 (2004 ANES).

<sup>10</sup> Economic forecast models of presidential vote share predicted an easy win for Bush in 1988. For other examples of economic conditions becoming more important determinants of vote choice over the course of presidential campaigns see: Hetherington 1996; Vavreck 2009.

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<sup>11</sup> Survey by Times Mirror. Methodology: Interviewing conducted by Gallup Organization, May 13 - May 22, 1988 and based on 3,021 face-to-face interviews; January 27 -February 5, 1989 and based on 2,048 face-to-face interviews. Datasets accessed from Roper Express's data archive.

<sup>12</sup> In the May 1988 PVS, 47.9 percent of Bush-Dukakis supporters who completely agreed with statement "I am very patriotic" preferred Bush, compared to his 39.5 percent of the two-party vote among respondents who provided another answer. In the January 1989 PVS Bush's support from these two groups had increased to 60.5 percent and 44.9 percent respectively. Respondents who completely agreed with the statement comprised 53.5 percent of May sample and 52.2 percent of the January PVS.

<sup>13</sup> The means on this patriotism item in the May PVS were .83 for Democrats, .81 for Independents and .89 for Republicans. In the January 1989 PVS they were .83 for Democrats, .84 for Independents and .88 for Republicans.

<sup>14</sup> Willie Horton was a convicted murderer who was released from a Massachusetts prison as part of a weekend furlough during Michael Dukakis's tenure as governor. While on furlough, Horton, who is black, twice raped a white woman after brutally assaulting her white fiancé. Mendelberg (2001) and Kinder and Sanders (1996) persuasively argue that Republicans intentionally used the Horton issue to appeal to racial anxieties.

<sup>15</sup> Sullivan et al. (1992) did not report a significant effect of patriotism on vote choice when using the ANES items. That null effect, however, was likely produced by including candidate evaluations in their model of vote choice.

<sup>16</sup> If Bush's 2000 voters were more likely to become patriotic in response to the 9/11 attacks, then that could artificially enhance the baseline impact of patriotism in Bush-Gore vote choice.

<sup>17</sup> Methodology: Conducted by Gallup Organization, November 13 - November 15, 2000 and based on 1,028 telephone interviews. This dataset was accessed from Roper Express's archive.

<sup>18</sup> Methodology: Interviewing conducted by Gallup Organization, June 25 - June 27, 1999 and based on 1,016 telephone interviews. This dataset was accessed from Roper Express's archive.

<sup>19</sup> Methodology: Interviewing conducted by Gallup Organization, January 2 - January 5, 2004 and based on 1,029 telephone interviews. Half of these respondents received the "proud to be American" item. This dataset was accessed from Roper Express's archive.

<sup>20</sup> Methodology: Interviewing conducted by ICR-International Communications Research, May 27 - August 2, 2004 and based on 1,888 telephone interviews. This dataset was accessed from Roper Express's archive.

<sup>21</sup> When racial resentment and Muslim favorability are omitted from the model, patriotism had about a 50 percent larger impact on support for McCain against Obama than it did in the McCain-Clinton matchup. This result is consistent with Sidanius and Pratto's (1999) argument

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that patriotic attitudes such as love of country are commensurate with negative feelings toward subordinate groups.

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## Supplemental Appendix

### **Measures of Patriotism**

*Patriotism (ANES)*: A seven category additive scale recoded from 0 (least patriotic) to 1 (most patriotic). Scale was constructed from the following two items: 1) How strong is your love for your country...extremely, very strong, somewhat strong, or not very strong? 2) When you see the American flag flying does it make you feel extremely good, very good, somewhat good, or not very good?

*Patriotism (CCAP)*: A seven category additive scale recoded from 0 (least patriotic) to 1 (most patriotic). Scale was constructed from the following two items: 1) How important is being an American to you personally? 2) When you see the American flag flying does it make you feel extremely good, very good, somewhat good, or not very good?

*I am Very Patriotic (PVS)*: A four category variable recoded from 0 (completely disagree) to 1 (completely agree).

*Pride in Being American (Gallup 2004; Kaiser 2004; CNN/ORC 2008)*: A four category variable recoded from 0 (only a little/not at all proud) to 1 (extremely proud)

*Pride in Being American (Gallup 2000)*: A four category variable recoded from 0 (not at all proud) to 1 (very proud)

*Importance in Being American: (ANES; CCAP)*: A four category variable recoded from 0 (not too; not at all important) to 1 (extremely important).

### **Control Variables**

*Age*: Respondents' actual ages.

*Authoritarianism*: An additive index ranging from 0 (least authoritarian) to 1 (most authoritarian). The scale was constructed from respondents' preferences for the following childrearing traits: 1) Independence or Respect for elders 2) Curiosity or Good Manners 3) Obedience or Self-Reliance 4) Being Considerate or Well Behaved.

*Black*: An indicator variable taking on a value of 1 (African-American) or 0 (non-black)

*Education*: A five-category variable ranging from 0 (no high school diploma) to 1 (post-graduate studies)

*Education (PVS)*: A four-category variable ranging from 0 (no high school diploma) to 1 (college graduate)

*Ideology*: A five-category variable recoded from 0 (extremely/very liberal) to 1 (extremely/very conservative). Don't know responses were coded as 0.5.

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*Male:* An indicator variable taking on a value of 1 (male) or 0 (female)

*Muslim Favorability:* A five category variable ranging from 0 (very unfavorable) to 1 (very favorable)

*Partisanship:* A seven-category variable ranging from 0 (strong Democrat) to 1 (strong Republican)

*Partisanship (Gallup; CNN/ORC; Kaiser):* A five-category variable ranging from 0 (Democrat) to 1 (Republican)

*Racial Resentment:* An additive index recoded from 0 (least resentful) to 1 (most resentful): The scale was constructed from how strongly respondents agreed or disagreed with the following assertions: 1) Irish, Italian, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors. 2) Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class. 3) Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve. 4) It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites.

*South:* An indicator variable taking on a value of 1 (Southern residence) or 0 (non-South)

Table A1: Predictors of George W. Bush Vote Preference (Logistic Regression)

	<u>ANES Panel Data</u>		<u>Bush-Gore Gallup</u>		2004 ANES
	2000	2004	June 1999	Nov' 2000	
Patriotism	1.64 (.841)	3.15 (.691)	.329 (.370)	.560 (.787)	1.36 (.554)
Authoritarianism	.718 (.620)	.595 (.473)			
Partisanship	6.12 (.573)	4.29 (.449)	4.61 (.304)	5.70 (.398)	6.08 (.491)
Ideology	4.92 (.966)	3.88 (.769)	2.30 (.459)	3.04 (.722)	3.38 (.762)
Education	.016 (.606)	-.335 (.473)	-.597 (.456)	.472 (.454)	-.299 (.456)
Age	-.015 (.010)	-.014 (.008)	-.001 (.006)	-.011 (.009)	.001 (.008)
Black	-1.82 (.989)	-1.93 (.859)	-.902 (.330)	-1.81 (.827)	-1.43 (.400)
Male	-.090 (.313)	-.006 (.255)	-.310 (.195)	.138 (.285)	-.211 (.248)
South	.572 (.348)	.381 (.274)		1.08 (.331)	.665 (.275)
Observations	586	626	942	766	801

*Source:* 2000-2002-2004 ANES Panelists; Gallup Surveys, June 1999 and November 2000; 2004 ANES  
*Note:* Dependent variables are coded 1 for Bush vote preference and 0 for Gore (2000)/Kerry (2004). Patriotism in the 2000-2004 ANES panel is a 2-item scale consisting of how strongly respondents love their country and how good seeing the flag makes them feel. Patriotism was not measured until the 2002 wave of the panel study; patriotism in the June 1999 Gallup survey is a four category variable ranging from 1 (extremely patriotic) to 0 (not very patriotic); patriotism in the November 2000 Gallup survey is a four category variable ranging from 1 (very proud to be American) to 0 (not too proud); patriotism in the 2004 ANES is a four category variable ranging from 1 (extremely important to be American) to 0 (not important)

Table A2: Predictors of George W. Bush Vote Preference (Logistic Regression)

	<b>January '04 Gallup Trial Heats</b>		Kaiser Poll	2004
	Bush v. Dem	Bush v. Dean	May-Aug '04	ANES
Pride/Importance in Being American	2.17 (.870)	1.97 (.696)	1.69 (.492)	1.36 (.554)
Partisanship	6.43 (.621)	5.40 (.521)	5.82 (.351)	6.08 (.491)
Ideology	2.17 (.926)	1.92 (.775)	1.46 (.370)	3.38 (.762)
Education	-.724 (.623)	-.483 (.538)	.241 (.356)	-.299 (.456)
Age	-.020 (.012)	-.013 (.011)	.014 (.078)	.001 (.008)
Black	-2.34 (.995)	-2.29 (.871)	-1.27 (.497)	-1.43 (.400)
Male	-.069 (.389)	-.244 (.336)	-.336 (.220)	-.211 (.248)
South	.374 (.419)	.217 (.361)	.692 (.251)	.665 (.275)
Observations	439	451	1064	801

*Source:* Gallup Poll, January 2004; Kaiser Foundation Poll, May-August 2004; 2004 ANES

*Note:* Dependent variables are coded 1 for Bush vote preference and 0 for Democratic vote preference. Patriotism is operationalized in the Gallup and Kaiser surveys with the exact same pride in America item, and measured in the 2004 ANES with “importance in being American.”



Table A3: Predictors of John McCain Vote Preference (Logistic Regression)

	<b>March '08 CCAP Trial Heats</b>		CCAP	CNN	CCAP
	McCain v. Clinton	McCain v. Obama	Nov '08	June '08	Nov '08
Patriotism	1.41 (.250)	1.39 (.273)	1.66 (.292)		
Racial Resentment	.558 (.220)	2.76 (.229)	2.74 (.250)		
Muslim Favorability	-.316 (.208)	-1.96 (.220)	-2.64 (.226)		
Pride/Importance in Being American				1.44 (.780)	1.64 (.212)
Partisanship	4.96 (.195)	3.38 (.185)	4.83 (.207)	4.74 (.469)	4.87 (.115)
Ideology	2.64 (.272)	2.01 (.309)	3.31 (.324)	2.44 (.838)	4.41 (.244)
Education	.587 (.211)	.061 (.235)	-.185 (.255)	.246 (.606)	-.662 (.185)
Age	-.007 (.004)	-.002 (.004)	-.001 (.004)	-.003 (.011)	.007 (.003)
Black	.117 (.163)	-1.28 (.193)	-1.37 (.263)	-1.44 (.890)	-2.37 (.214)
Male	.422 (.097)	-.168 (.103)	-.103 (.106)	.432 (.359)	.044 (.085)
South	-.054 (.106)	.241 (.104)	.261 (.104)	.559 (.363)	.360 (.087)
Observations	10323	10480	11340	398	13448

*Source:* CCAP; CNN Poll, July 2008.

*Note:* Dependent variables are coded 1 for McCain vote preference and 0 for Obama/Clinton vote preference.

The CNN analysis is based on the pride in being American item, and the CCAP analysis in column 5 uses importance in being American.

All independent variables in the CCAP analyses were measured in September 2008 except Muslim favorability, which was assessed in the October 2008 wave of the panel study.

Table A4: Predictors of Republican Vote Choice for House of Representatives (Logistic Regression)

	<b>ANES Cross-Sectional Data</b>				<b>ANES Panel Data</b>			
	1988	1992	2002	2004	1992	1994	2004	2006
Patriotism	.804 (.434)	-.051 (.336)	1.46 (.529)	1.73 (.526)	-.278 (.543)	.490 (.532)	1.93 (.701)	1.73 (.786)
Partisanship	3.14 (.257)	3.08 (.231)	3.65 (.344)	3.74 (.391)	2.91 (.371)	3.43 (.377)	4.15 (.511)	4.54 (.575)
Ideology	1.45 (.447)	1.66 (.374)	1.56 (.541)	1.83 (.648)	1.74 (.578)	1.88 (.583)	2.11 (.802)	2.25 (.904)
Education	.649 (.286)	.239 (.251)	-.881 (.372)	.276 (.396)	.204 (.425)	.721 (.413)	-.223 (.518)	.262 (.565)
Age	.006 (.005)	-.006 (.004)	-.017 (.007)	.006 (.007)	.005 (.007)	-.001 (.007)	.010 (.009)	-.010 (.011)
Male	-.099 (.161)	-.156 (.140)	.097 (.199)	.054 (.216)	-.330 (.231)	-.508 (.233)	-.124 (.279)	-.178 (.300)
Black	-.934 (.494)	-.866 (.319)	-1.23 (.514)	-1.67 (.471)	-.362 (.429)	-.852 (.416)	-2.19 (.779)	-.135 (.644)
South	-.800 (.190)	.171 (.154)	.405 (.214)	.155 (.243)	.490 (.243)	.490 (.242)	.039 (.316)	.441 (.329)
Observations	1021	1275	741	696	472	540	479	405

*Source:* 1988, 1992, 2002, 2004 ANES; 1992-1994, 2004-2006 ANES Panelists.

*Note:* Dependent variables are coded 1 for Republican vote choice and 0 for Democratic vote choice.